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Comments
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOCAL
ANTI-POLLUTION ORDINANCES
Introduction
Local governments have recently expanded their efforts to abate pollu-
tion problems. New York City, for example, has enacted a law that
severely restricts the sale and use of gasolines with pollutants and bans
all leaded gasoline after January 1, 1974.1 The constitutionality of such
local ordinances under both federal and state law, however, has not yet
been adequately determined. There havebeen so few cases on this subject
in New York, or in any other state, that local governments may be in
doubt as to their power to legislate in this field.
In order to clarify the constitutional limits of local environmental
laws, it is necessary to examine the relevant questions raised by both the
United States Constitution and the various state constitutions. Part I of
this comment will deal with the federal-local conflicts and Part II will
discuss the state-local conflicts. In each of the two sections, relevant legis-
lation in the environmental field will be discussed. Finally, a model
statute will be offered as an example of the wide range of powers a
locality can constitutionally exercise.'
PART I
FEDERAL-LOCAL CONFLICTS
The Commerce Clause and Federal Pre-Emption
Local governments are not political entities recognized by the United
States Constitution and have no legislative powers other than those ex-
pressly granted by the state.' In exercising such powers the major prob-
1. New York City, N.Y. Ad. Code ch. 57, § 1403.2-13.11 (Williams Supp.
1971).
2. This comment is limited to direct regulation of existing pollution. There
are, of course, methods which can be used to prevent the construction of polluting
facilities in a locality. Zoning is a prime example of one of these methods and is
unquestionably a powerful protection device. For a general discussion of the con-
stitutional issues involved in zoning, see Comment, The Constitutionality of Local
Zoning, 79 Yale L.J. 896 (1970).
3. This principle is well established in American law. The existence of the mu-
nicipal corporation as a creature of the state was recognized by the Supreme Court
in Bissell v. City of Jeffersonville, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 287 (1861). In New York,
the principle was articulated in Brown v. Trustees, Hamptonburg School Dist., 303
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lem that local ordinances must overcome is presented by the commerce
clause.4 In our complex society, expansion of the commerce clause by
Supreme Court interpretation has reached the point where almost any
state or local statute can be challenged as interfering with interstate
commerce and therefore in conflict with the commerce clause. 5 The
extent to which a political subdivision can regulate businesses or other
activities engaged in interstate commerce is a crucial question.
If Congress has not legislated in the area in question, then the state
or locality may do so as long as its legislation does not unduly burden
interstate commerce. 6 But what constitutes an undue burden? The test
that has been espoused by the Supreme Court is a rather vague one; the
interest of the locality in regulating its own health and safety is balanced
against the effect that the legislation will have on interstate commerce.7
N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866 (1952): "It is a familiar principle of our law that a
municipal corporation is a body politic. It is created by statute and, as an instru-
mentality of the general government of the State, it exercises powers of govern-
ment Which are delegated to it by the Legislature.... it is a creature of the Legis-
lature...." Id. at 488, 104 N.E.2d at 868.
4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
5. The commerce clause has noticeably been "stretched" by the Supreme Court
in a series of cases arising out of the public accommodations section of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §'§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970). See Daniel v. Paul,
395 U.S. 298 (1969). In this case the question was whether a private recrea-
tion area at Lake Nixon, Arkansas, was a public accommodation affecting
commerce within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act. The Court found
that the club's snack bar, a small part of the recreation complex, was a facility in
interstate commerce because a major part of the ingredients in the hot dog and
hamburger rolls came from out of state, as did most of the ingredients in the soft
drinks. Therefore, the "snack bar's status as a covered establishment automatically
brings the Lake Nixon facility within the ambit of [the Act]." Id. at 305; see also
United States v. Johnson Lake, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D. Ala. 1970); Scott v.
Young, 307 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Va. 1969) (mem.), aff'd, 421 F.2d 143 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970); United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp.
370 (E.D. La. 1969). In Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), the federal
anti-loansharking provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 891-96 (1970), were held to be within the power of Congress under the com-
merce clause even though the individual loanshark operated purely in an intrastate
manner. It was sufficient that his activities fell within a "class of activities" which,
in total, affected interstate commerce.
6. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
7. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945); Terminal R.R.
Ass'n v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 8 (1943); Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943); Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central I11. Pub. Ser. Co.,
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In Soap & Detergent Association v. Clark,' for example, a district court
in Florida upheld a county ordinance barring all phosphates from deter-
gents. The court found that the law did not impose an undue burden on
interstate commerce because, in balancing the benefit of the ordinance
in improving the quality of water in the county against the financial harm
to the detergent industry from complying with such a ban, the court felt
that "the scales are strongly tipped" in favor of the ordinance.'
When Congress has in fact legislated in a particular area, however,
this weighing process is inapplicable if Congress, through such legisla-
tion, has pre-empted the area. Pre-emption occurs when it is the intention
of Congress, express or implied, to prohibit state and local governments
from legislating in the area.10 If Congress has indeed pre-empted all of
the powers in a given area, the locality is prevented from legislating in
that area by the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution."
The mere fact, however, that Congress has legislated in an area does
not raise the presumption that the area has been pre-empted; the intention
of Congress to do so must be clearly manifested. 2 In Huron-Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,"3 for example, shipowners sought an in-
junction to prevent the city from prosecuting complaints under a mu-
nicipal smoke abatement ordinance. The shipowners argued that since
the ships were inspected and licensed by the federal government, the
area had been pre-empted. The Court disagreed, stating that the intention
of Congress to pre-empt "is not to be implied unless the act of Congress
fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State."' 4 The
Court found no such conflict. In the exercise of their power to preserve
314 U.S. 498, 504-05 (1942); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927)
(dissenting opinion).
8. 330 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
9. Id. at 1222. Similarly, a county court in Maryland held that a city ordinance
requiring deposits on all beverage containers was not discriminatory nor an un-
reasonable burden on interstate commerce. 2 BNA Envir. Rep.-Curr. Devs. 1049
(1971). A recent New York case, however, declared unconstitutional a New York
City tax on plastic containers as violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Society of Plastics Indus. v. City of New York, 68 Misc.
2d 366, 326 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
10. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945).
11. U.S. Const. art. VI. See Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, AFL, 346 U.S.
485 (1953); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (18i9).
12. Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740
(1942); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902).
13. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
14. Id. at 443, citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
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health and welfare, therefore, "the states and their instrumentalities may
act, in many areas of interstate commerce and maritime activities, con-
currently with the federal government."'15 In the area of air pollution and
aircraft noise control, however, there has been partial, but not complete,
pre-emption.
The Clear Air Act
The Clean Air Act of 1967, as amended by the Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1970,16 is presently the major piece of federal legislation in the
air pollution field."x Local governments planning to enact their own pol-
lution regulations must consider the provisions of this Act. Generally
speaking, if the Act had pre-empted the field, or .any part thereof, any
local law attempting to encroach upon the pre-empted area would be
unconstitutional.
Rather than pre-empting the field, however, the Act generally seeks to
encourage local pollution control by enunciating the principle "that the
prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary re-
sponsibility of States and local governments.' 8 Each state assumes this
responsibility by "submitting an implementation plan for such State
which shall specify the manner in which national primary and secondary
ambient air quality standards will be achieved and maintained within
each air quality control region in such State."'19 The administrator of the
federal program will approve the state plan if ,it meets certain require-
ments.10
There is, however, express pre-emption in the field of motor vehicle
emission. control:
No state or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any
standard relating -to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines subject to this part.2'
15. Id. at 442. A Maryland circuit court recently upheld the constitutionality
of a Maryland statute prohibiting dredging and filling "sand, gravel or other ag-
gregates or minerals, in any of the tidal waters or marshland" of Charles County,
Maryland, as a reasonable exercise of state police powers -since it is necessary to
protect the county wetlands. 2 BNA Envir. Rep.-Curr. Devs. 1332 (1972).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (1970).
17. For other examples of federal legislation in the environmental area, see
Water Pollution Control Act, 33:U.S*C. §§ 1151-75 (1970); OilPollution Act, 33
U.S.C.§§'I001-15 (1970).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a) (3) (1970).
19. Id. § 1857c-2(a).
20. Id.§ 1857c-5(a)(2).
21. Id. § 1857f-6a(a).
1972]
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Federal pre-emption in this area is subject to two exceptions. First, by
limiting the scope of the section to "new motor vehicles," the Act ap-
parently leaves the regulation of used motor vehicles to the state and
local governments. 22 Secondly, any state that adopted standards prior to
March 30, 1966, may apply to the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare for a waiver of this section's application.23 California is the only
state that qualifies for this exception. 24 In short, state and local govern-
ments have little legislative flexibility in the area of motor vehicle emis-
sion control.
Aircraft Noise Control
Aircraft noise has become a major problem for localities situated near
airports. When these localities have attempted to reduce the noise by
regulating the flow of the aircraft flying above them they have been
hindered by substantial federal pre-emption in this area. A prime example
is the case of American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park.25
Audubon Park passed a city ordinance which made it unlawful to fly
over the city limits under a height of 750 feet. The United States District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky considered the power of the
Federal Aviation Administration to adopt rules and regulations to con-
trol the use of navigable airspace. 2 Deciding that the federal regulations
were legitimately adopted, the court ruled that the city ordinance was in
direct conflict with the FAA regulations and that the ordinance was void
because it was an "intolerable and undue burden upon interstate and
foreign commerce."27 More importantly, the court found an intent by
22. The difference between a "new" or "used" motor vehicle, within the mean-
ing of the Act, may well become academic in a few years. A "new motor vehicle"
is defined as one which has not reached the ultimate purchaser. 42 U.S.C.A. §
1857f-7(3) (Supp. 1972). Once it is determined that the vehicle is a "new" vehi-
cle, the federal regulation, and hence the federal pre-emption, will apply to the
"useful life" of the vehicle. Id. § 1857f-1 (a) (1). The "useful life" of a vehicle is
a period of five years or 50,000 miles, whichever comes first. Id. § 1857f-1 (d) (1),
(2). Thus all vehicles classified as "used" at the time of passage of the 1970 amend-
ments will not be -subject to federal regulation but vehicles defined as "new"
at that time and all subsequent new vehicles will be subject to federal regulation
for the five year or 50,000 mile period.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a(b) (1970).
24. See H.R. Rep. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1967). See also C.
Havinghurst, Air Pollution Control (1969).
25. 297 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Ky. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 845 (1969).
26. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1348(a), 1348(c) (1970).
27. 297 F. Supp. at 211.
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Congress to pre-empt the entire field of law with respect to the regulation
of interstate and foreign air traffic.28 The reasoning of this case reinforced
an earlier decision which had held that a village ordinance setting a
1,000 foot minimum altitude for overflying aircraft was unconstitutional
because the federal law pre-empted the field.29
Besides setting minimum altitude limits, another approach of muni-
cipalities has been to ban all overflights or to limit the use of certain
runways which have flight patterns over the aggrieved area. In one of
these cases, a town's "unnecessary" noise ordinance, insofar as it applied
to aircraft using nearby airports, was found to be invalid since it was
in direct conflict with applicable regulations of the FAA .30 This conflict
arose because the patterns necessary to comply with the local ordinance
would require an alteration in the flight pattern established by FAA regu-
lations.31
Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association v. Port of New York Authority"12
clearly shows that not all attempts to lessen aircraft noise are doomed to
failure. In this case the Port Authority, as owner and operator of John
F. Kennedy International Airport, imposed a fee of $25.00 for taking
off and landing at peak traffic hours. Imposition of the fee had the intent,
and indeed the effect, of limiting the use of the runways by general avia-
tion. While the fee was in effect, the FAA adopted its "High Density
Traffic Airports" regulation providing for a priority system of take-off
and landing during peak traffic hours." The court decided that the FAA
contemplated the continuance of the Port Authority's regulation because
the purpose of the FAA regulation was to correct delays at certain major
airports and not to correct safety problems. 4 It appeared to the court
that the FAA had decided that additional measures were needed and
acted under its power to provide for the efficient utilization of airspace."5
The court said that the fee does. not run counter to FAA regulations but,
"simply has the tendency. further to restrict the traffic restricted by the
28. Id. at 21.2.
29. All Am. Airways v. Village of Cedarhurst, 106 F. Supp. 521 (E.D.N.Y.
1952), aft'd, 201 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1953).
30. American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
31. Id.; 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1304, 1348 (1970).
32. 305 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
33. 14C.F.R. §§ 93.121-93.133 (subpart K) (1972).
34. 305 F. Supp. at 99, 100.
35. 49.U.S.C. §§ 1348(a), 1348(c) (1970).
1972]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
federal regulation ... for an aim common to both sets of regulations." 6
Thus local provisions are not prohibited if they regulate interstate
activities not pre-empted by Congress, and if the regulations do not
constitute an undue burden."
PART II
STATE-LOCAL CONFLICTS
Local anti-pollution ordinances generally face the same obstacles in
relation to state law as they do with respect to federal law. The problems
with state constitutions, however, are theoretically more extensive be-
cause, unlike the federal-state relationship where the states retain all
powers not expressly granted to the federal government,38 local political
subdivisions have only those powers which are granted by the state." If
the power to legislate is not granted by the state constitution or by a state
statute, then the local government's legislation is void.4 0
When dealing with the problems presented by the state-local relation-
ship, it is necessary to determine the exact extent of powers granted to
local governments. Even if the locality is free to legislate in an area,
the proposed statute should be examined to see if the power is used rea-
sonably. An inquiry must also be made as to whether there are any
conflicts between the local law and existing state laws that would invali-
date the local legisation. A consideration of these questions as they apply
to New York law will clarify the state-local government relationship.
The Constitutional Grant of Power
The basic provision of New York law dealing with the powers of local
governments is article IX of the state constitution." Section 1 of article
36. 305 F. Supp. at 105.
37. The Supreme Court has held that a municipal ordinance charging a one
dollar per passenger emplaning fee was not an undue burden on interstate com-
merce. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dis. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707
(1972). It is interesting to note that 18 airlines recently signed a court-approved
agreement whereby the airlines promised to install anti-pollution devices by De-
cember 31, 1972, on their jets which use New York airports and are equipped
with Pratt & Whitney JT8D engines. It is believed that this action will eliminate
70 per cent of the total smoke emissions from jets using Kennedy and La Guardia
Airports. The agreement was reached in settlement of a state court suit initiated
by the New York Attorney General. 2 BNA Envir. Rep.-Curr. Devs. 1180
(1972). See also L. Lefkowitz, Jamaica Bay: An Urban Marshland in Transition,
I Fordham Urban L.J. 1, 9-13 (1972).
38. U.S. Const. amend. X.
39. See note 2 supra.
40. Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 310 (1898).
41. N.Y. Const. art. IX.
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IX is known as the "[bill of rights for local governments" and basically
gives such localities the general powers normally associated with a gov-
ernmental body, such as the power to take private property by eminent
domain,42 to have an elected legislative body43 and to make agreements
with other localities, states or the federal government. 44
It is section 2, however, giving specific powers to the local govern-
ments and limiting the power of the state legislature to interfere with the
exercise of these powers, that raises the major legal questions. Local
governments are given the power to pass local laws relating to its "prop-
erty, affairs or government. '45 Although this clause is part of the
constitutional amendment that became effective in 1964, the phrase
"property, affairs or government" has been in the New York Constitution
at least since the turn of the century as an affirmative grant of powers to
local governments.46 This power, unlike the powers conferred by section
1, however, is not immune from limitations placed upon it by the state
legislature.. The state may act in relation to the "property, affairs or
government" of a locality, but may only do so by "general law" passed
by a simple majority or by a "special law" requiring a two-thirds vote of
the legislature.47 Thus the scope of "property, affairs or government"
must be determined for two reasons: first, to define the limits of local
powers and second, to decide which powers the legislature cannot abridge
without a general law or a two-thirds vote of the legislature.
Cases interpreting the phrase "property, affairs or government" have
generally given it a restrictive meaning. In the leading case on the sub-
ject, Adler V. Deegan,48 Judge Cardozo, in a concurring opinion, articu-
lated the doctrine that any matter of substantial state concern, even if
intermingled with local concern, does not fall under the "property, affairs
or government" of the locality. This "Doctrine of State Concern" has
grown to the point where the local government is prohibited from
legislating so long as there remains some degree of state concern, even
42. Id. §1 (e).
43. Id. § 1(a).
44. Id. § 1(c).
45. Id. § 2(c)(i).
46. This section can be traced back to the Constitution of 1846, as art. III,
§ 22, as added in 1874; as added in the Constitution of 1894, art. III, § 26; as
amended in 1899, 1921, 1929, 1935 and then as added in the Constitution of
1938, art. IX, § 3. "Historical Note," art. IX, § 3, p. 549 (McKinney 1969).
47. N;Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(b) (2). A "general law" is one applying to all
counties, cities, towns or villages. Id. § 3(d) (1). Its antithesis, the "special law"
is one applying to "one or more, but not all, counties .... cities, towns or villages."
Id. § 3(d)(4).
48. 251 N.Y. 467,484, 167 N.E. 705,711 (1929).
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if the subject matter of a law is primarily of local interest. In Ainslie v.
Lounsbery,4 for example, the court struck down a local law establishing
qualifications for the city examining board for plumbers. The court found
that the regulation of plumbing and drainage fell within the area of
public health which is a matter of state concern and therefore was not
within the confines of the "property, affairs or government" of a city.
Fortunately, however, local governments no longer need search for
legislative powers within the restrictive meaning of "property, affairs or
government" because they have additional powers as an affirmative
constitutional grant:
[Elvery local government' shall have power to adopt and amend local laws ...
relating to the following subjects, whether or not they relate to the property, affairs
or government of such local governments .... 50
(6) The acquisition, care, management and use of its highways, roads, streets,
avenues and property .... 51
(8) The levy, collection and administration of local taxes authorized by the legis-
lature ... for local improvements .... 52
(10) The government, protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being
of persons or property therein. 53
The particularly broad grant of power in subdivision (10) above is the
primary source of additional local powers. The impact of this provision
has almost revolutionary potential because matters of health, previously
held to be matters of state concern, 54 are now expressly made a legitimate
area of local concern. The "Doctrine of State Concern" is only a limita-
tion upon the powers of localities that derive from the general grant of
powers; it is not a limitation on express constitutional grants of powers.
Moreover, article IX provides that "[r]ights, powers, privileges and im-
munities granted to local governments shall be liberally construed." 5"
It seems likely, therefore, that local governments in New York share
49. 275 App. Div. 729, 86 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dep't 1949) (mem.). See also
City of Poughkeepsie v. Vassar College, 35 Misc. 2d 604, 232 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Sup.
Ct. 1961).
50. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(c) (ii) (emphasis added).
51. Id. §2(c)(6).
52. Id. § 2(c)(8).
53. Id. § 2(c)(10).
54. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
55. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 3(c); Krolick v. Lowery, 32 App. Div. 2d 317, 322,
302 N.Y.S.2d 109, 114 (1st Dep't 1969), aff'd mem., 26 N.Y.2d 723, 257 N.E.2d
56, 308 N.Y.S.2d 879, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1075 (1970). The effect of this
phrase upon the "property, affairs or government" provision must be substantial,
since both phrases appear in the same article.
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concurrent powers with the state on matters of health and the environ-
ment.
The Statutory Grant of Power
In addition to the constitutional grant of power, municipalities may
obtain added powers from the state legislature. The legislature has
enacted several statutes5" granting localities additional powers. Villages,
for example, have been given the power to regulate the emission of
smoke and gases, the sources thereof, and the use of bituminous coal. 57
In addition, power is given to regulate and prohibit "whistling, ringing
of bells and other noises."5 8 A city may expend funds for any "public
or municipal purpose,"59 including "the promotion of . . . beauty . . .
health... comfort and convenience.... ."0 In addition, a city may order
the repair or removal of a building that endangers health.61 A county
has been given the power to expend and appropriate funds to provide
for the disposition of solid wastes.62 Thus, when determining if a locality
has the power to legislate in an area, the statutes relating to that type
of municipality should be examined for possible explicit grants of power.
The Reasonableness Requirement
Localities must also be aware of the requirement that a government
cannot impose unnecessary or unreasonable requirements on local busi-
nesses under the guise of promoting the general welfare.6 These regula-
tions must have a real and substantial relationship to the objective of
promoting the local welfare. 64 A local environmental law, such as one
regulating the removal of top soil, must meet this requirement. 5
56. N.Y. County Law (McKinney 1972); N.Y. Gen. City Law (McKinney
1968); N.Y. Town Law (McKinney 1965); N.Y. Village Law (McKinney 1966).
57. N.Y. Village Law § 89(54) (McKinney 1966).
58. Id. § 89(48) (a). The Village of Tuckahoe, for example, has enacted a
noise ordinance pursuant to the powers given it under the Village Law. Tuckahoe,
N.Y. Ordinance 34, § 2. For a discussion of this ordinance see Stoffel Seals Corp.
v. Village of Tuckahoe, 206 Misc. 597, 134 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
59. N.Y. Gen. City Law § 20(5) (McKinney 1968).
60. Id. § 21.
61. -Id.§ 20(35).
62. N.Y. County Law § 226-b(1) (McKinney 1972).
63. Trio Distrib. Corp. v. City of Albany, 2 N.Y.2d 690, 143 N.E.2d 329,
163 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1957).
64. Bon-Air Estates, Inc. v. Building Inspector, 3"1 App. Div. 2d 502, 298
N.Y.S.2d 763 (2d Dep't 1969); People v. Chimino, 39 Misc. 2d 555, 241 N.Y.S.2d
759 (Tonawanda City Ct. 1963).
65. Burroughs Landscape Constr. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 186 Misc. 930,
61 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
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The Consistency Requirement and
Relevant State Laws
A major impediment to local environmental legislation is the require-
ment that it not be inconsistent with any state law. The constitutional
grant of power to local governments provides that "every local govern-
ment shall have power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent
with the provisions of.. . any general law...."66
This consistency requirement has generally been construed as invali-
dating any ordinance that has stricter requirements than a state law on
the same subject. In Wholesale Laundry Board of Trade, Inc. v. City of
New York, 7 for example, the New York City Minimum Wage Law was
invalidated because it forbade hiring at a wage which state law permitted.
In the environmental area, however, the term "inconsistent" has a
different interpretation. The air pollution control article of the Environ-
mental Conservation Law [hereinafter the ECL] is a recently enacted
statute combining many environmental provisions of various state
statutes. It provides:
Any local laws, ordinances or regulations of a county, city, town or village which
comply with at least the minimum applicable requirements set forth in any code,
rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to this article shall be deemed consistent
with this article or with any such code, rule or regulation. 68
This statement implies that a local air pollution ordinance can have
stricter requirements than the state law on the subject.69 In regard to
water pollution, however, the ECL does not specifically refer to the
consistency problem, but rather states:
It is the purpose of this . . .article to provide additional . . .remedies . . .and
nothing herein contained shall abridge or alter rights of action or remedies now or
hereafter existing, nor shall any ... provisions . . .be construed as estopping the
state, persons or municipalities . .. in the exercise of their rights .. . to abate
any pollution now or hereafter existing.70
Since the statute recognizes the right of localities to abate pollution, it
66. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(c) (i) (emphasis added).
67. 17 App. Div. 2d 327, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1st Dep't 1962), aff'd 12 N.Y.2d
998, 189 N.E.2d 623, 239 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1963). See also Robin v. Inc. Vii. of
Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347, 285 N.E.2d 285, 334 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1972) and Kim
v. Town of Orangetown, 66 Misc. 2d 364, 321 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1971),
holding that a village and town ordinance, respectively, forbidding abortion acts
except in hospitals were invalid as inconsistent with state law and as legislation in
an area pre-empted by the state.
68. N.Y. Environ. Conserv. Law § 19-0709 (McKinney 1972) (emphasis
added).
69. Id.; 24 Op. St. Compt. 780 (1968).
70. N.Y. Environ. Conserv. Law § 17-1101 (McKinney 1972).
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follows that any local water pollution regulation should be favorably
regarded by the courts.
The "Declaration of Policy"'" of the ECL gives further indication that
the state legislature looks favorably upon local legisation intended to
abate air and water pollution:
It shall further be the policy of the state to improve and coordinate the environ-
mental plans, functions, powers and programs of the state, in cooperation with the
federal government, regions, local governments, other public and private organiza-
tions and the concerned individual .... 72
The ECL also states that:
[Tihe commissioner shall have power to:
a. Coordinate and develop policies, planning and programs related to the environ-
ment of the state and regions thereof;
b. Promote and coordinate management of water, land, and air resources . . .7
In Oriental Boulevard Company v. Heller,'4 the New York Court of
Appeals cited these sections in finding that the ECL did not pre-empt
the area of air pollution control so as to invalidate a New York City
ordinance regulating fuel burners and refuse incinerators."
The recently enacted New York City Noise Control Code 7  [here-
inafter referred to as the Code] is a practical example of a local environ-
mental law that must be judged in light of the consistency requirement.
Excessive noise, as the Code points out, 77 has been proven to be harm-
ful to health and thus falls under the health provision of the state consti-
tution.78 Certain provisions of the Code, dealing with noises generated
by motor vehicles, must contend with the state's Vehicle and Traffic Law
[hereinafter referred to as the VTL].79
The VTL states that the "provisions of this chapter shall be applicable
and uniform throughout this state. . . ."0 and that local authorities are
barred from passing any ordinance in conflict with the VTL or even from
71. N.Y. Environ. Conserv. Law § 1-0101 (McKinney 1972).
72. Id. § 1-0101(2) (emphasis added).
73. Id. § 3-0301 (1) (a), (b).
74. 27 N.Y.2d 212, 265 N.E.2d 72, 316 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1970), appeal dis-
missed, 401 U.S. 986 (1971).
75. New York City, N.Y. Ad. Code ch. 41, §§ 892-4.2, 892-4.3 (Williams
1971). The chapter was repealed by L.L. 1971, No. 49, Aug. 20, 1971.
76. New York City, N.Y., Noise Control Code, Oct. 4, 1972.
77. Id. § 1.03.
78. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(c)(10).
79. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law (McKinney 1971).
80. Id. § 1600.
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duplicating any provisions of the VTL as a local ordinance."' The result
is that only state agencies may regulate the operation and inspection of
motor vehicles. But throughout the VTL certain powers are given to
the localities, and any local government that passes an ordinance which
in fact regulates motor vehicles, even one which has as its main purpose
the abating of noise, must be exercising one of the enumerated powers
left to the localities by the VTL, if the regulation is to be upheld. 2
Conclusion
Despite the absence of litigation on the subject of local anti-pollution
legislation, an analysis of relevant federal and New York law leads to
the conclusion that local governments have a wide scope of powers in
the environmental field. The pre-emption and consistency doctrines will
present grounds for restraints on local anti-pollution laws, but local gov-
ernments have ample constitutional and statutory powers with which to
counter these doctrines in most cases.
In the crucial and burgeoning field of environmental law, local govern-
ments have an ideal opportunity to assert their potentially great, but
feebly exercised, legislative powers. If local authorities depend exclu-
sively upon the state legislature for environmental legislation, not only
81. Id.
82. A comparison of the Code with the VTL illustrates some of the problem
areas. Sections 4.05(i) and (ii) of the Code restrict the use of claxons and horns.
The VTL specifically provides that localities with over one million population may
regulate "the use of horns, lights and other required equipment of vehicles." N.Y.
Veh. & Traf. Law § 1642(a)(14) (McKinney 1971). Thus, subsections (i) and
(ii) are permissible, Subsection (iv) provides, inter alia, that an auto-burglar
alarm must be of the type that terminates after 15 minutes. It may be argued that
this subsection does not deal with the operation or use of the device as required
by the VTL's grant of power to local governments, but the better reasoning is that
this requirement falls within the intent of the VTL provision. Section 4.07 of the
Code limits the use of emergency signal devices to emergency situations, and since
it concerns only that use, there is no question as to its validity.
Section 4.15 of the Code prohibits the discharge of an exhaust which creates an
unnecessary noise. Section 375(31) of the VTL prohibits the modification of a
muffler system to amplify noise. The two sections are not in apparent conflict, but
again the power of the City to regulate the equipment of a motor vehicle where
it has not been granted specific power to do so is questionable. Section 4.15, how-
ever, does not specifically require any equipment, although it might be construed
to require a muffling system. It could then be argued that it does not fall within
the state's pre-emption since the purpose of the pre-emption is to create state-wide
uniformity and 4.15 does not necessarily require something that is inconsistent
with uniform state control.
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will they lose control over anti-pollution laws primarily affecting their
local areas, but they will once again be abnegating the principles of home
rule.
A MODEL MUNICIPAL ENVIRONMENTAL CODE
Introduction
The purpose of including a model code is to give the reader some idea
of the possible scope of local environmental legislation. The Code is not
meant to be comprehensive but rather is merey set forth as an example.
It is, therefore, general in scope and does not concern itself with issues
not discussed in this comment and may apply to a city, town or village.
The Code
Article I. Statement of Purpose
It is the purpose of this Code to provide for the protection of the
health, safety and welfare of the people of this municipality by conserving
and enhancing the environment and controlling water, land, air and
noise pollution.
Article II. Environmental Planning Commission
1. An Environmental Planning Commission, hereinafter referred to as
the Commission, is hereby established. It shall be composed of three
members appointed by the [City, Town or Village] Council for a term of
two years.
2. The Commission shall promulgate standards consistent with the pur-
pose and scope of this Code. It shall determine which type of facilities
and devices are to be placed on an Operating Certificate List and issue
certificates only to those facilities and devices on the List that meet the
promulgated standards.8 3
3. No person shall cause or permit the use or operation of any type of
facility or device placed on the Operating Certificate List without first
obtaining a certificate from the Commission.
4. The Commission may make or cause to be made any investigation,
study or inspection which in its opinion is desirable for the purpose of
controlling or abating a violation of this Code.
5. (a) The Commission shall have the power to conduct hearings and,
by the issuance of subpoena, compel the attendance of witnesses and the
83. The concept of a requirement of an operating certificate comes from the
New York City, N.Y., Ad. Code ch. 41, §§ 892-4.0, 892-4.1 (Williams 1971). The
chapter was repealed by L.L. 1971, No. 49, Aug. 20, 1971.
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production of any books, papers or other items relating to the matter
under investigation.
(b) The hearing shall be conducted in a fair and impartial manner
and any Commissioner who, for any reason, cannot judge the merits of
a case in an impartial manner, shall absent himself from any considera-
tion thereof.
(c) The party under investigation shall have at least 15 days written
notice of the charges against him, an opportunity to cross-examine wit-
nesses, the power of subpoena equivalent to that of the Commission, as
set forth in subsection (a), and an opportunity to otherwise present evi-
dence in his own behalf.
-6. If the Commission has reasonable cause to believe that any facility
or device is in violation of this Code, the Commission may order the
owner of such facility or device to conduct such tests as are necessary in
the opinion of the Commission to determine whether the facility or de-
vice or its operation is in violation of this Code and to submit the test
results to the Commission within 10 days after the completion of the
tests. Such tests shall be conducted in a manner approved by the Com-
mission.
7. If, in the opinion of the Commission, further tests are necessary, the
Commission may order the owner to conduct such tests or to provide
such access to the facility or device as the Commissioners may reason-
ably request for the purpose of conducting such tests. The owner shall
be furnished with copies of the analytical results of the data collected.
8. If any facility, device or building is found to be in violation of the
provisions of this Code, or of the regulations established as provided
herein, the Commission shall notify the owner of the facility, device or
building of such violation and set a reasonable period, not to exceed one
year, within which the owner must abate the violation.
9. If a violation of this Code is not abated after reasonable notice has
been given pursuant to section 8 of this article, and after a hearing pur-
suant to section 5 of this article, the Conmmission may:
(a) Revoke or suspend a certificate issued pursuant to section 2 of
this article;
(b) Order the owner of any facility, device or building which causes
or is maintained or operated so as to cause a violation of any provision of
this Code to install any apparatus which can reasonably be expected to
correct the violation, or to repair, properly maintain, replace or alter
such facility, device or building in a manner which can reasonably be
expected to correct the violation;
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(c) Seal any facility, device or building which causes or is maintained
or operated so as to cause a violation of any provision of this Code or
regulations promulgated thereunder;
(d) Order any person to cease and desist from any activity which
causes, or is conducted so as to cause, a violation of any provision of this
Code, or any order or regulation promulgated thereunder;
(e) Impose a civil penalty not exceeding $1,000 for each day of the
violation against any person who continues to violate this Code, or any
order or regulation promulgated thereunder, after reasonable notice of
said violations.
10. (a) Any person, other than a municipal employee authorized to
serve summonses for a violation of this Code, may make a complaint to
the Commission alleging that a person violated a provision of this Code,
or order or regulation promulgated thereunder, together with evidence
of such violation.
(b) Any person who submits a complaint pursuant to subsection (a)
of this section shall be entitled to 25 per cent of any civil penalty col-
lected from any proceeding arising from such complaint.
Article III. Water Pollution
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to throw,
drain, run or otherwise discharge into waters which are either wholly or
in part within the boundaries of this municipality, any organic or inor-
ganic material that shall cause or contribute to a condition in contraven-
tion of the standards adopted by the Commission. "
Article IV. Air Pollution
1. The purpose of this article is to eliminate all pollutants from the air
which are found to be harmful to the health of the residents of this mu-
nicipality.
2. No person shall cause or permit the emission into the open air from
any source, whether fixed or mobile, and whether on land, air or water,
of any harmful pollutant including, but not restricted to, smoke, soot, fly
ash, dirt, fumes, gas vapors and odors,8" unless certified by the Commis-
sion.
84. The language of this section is essentially that of the N.Y. Pub. Health Law
§ 1220 (McKinney 1971).
85. The phrase "smoke, soot, fly ash, dirt, fumes, gas vapor and odors" is
taken from New York City, N.Y. Ad. Code ch. 41, § 892-1.0 (Williams 1971).
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3. The Commission shall promulgate ambient air standards consistent
with the purpose of this article as set forth in section 1.
Article V. Noise Control
1. No person shall make, continue, cause or permit to be made or con-
tinued any unnecessary noise.16
2. Violations of this article shall include but not be limited to:
(a) Causing or permitting the use of sound reproduction devices such
as to cause unnecessary noise;
(b) Causing or permitting the use of a claxon or air horn on a motor
vehicle except as a sound signal of imminent danger;
(c) Causing or permitting the use of a burglar alarm incapable of
automatically terminating its operation within 30 minutes of its being
activated.
(d) Causing or permitting the use of a construction device in such a
manner as to create a sound level exceeding the applicable level set by
the Commission.
Article VI. Phosphates Banned
No detergent or other cleaning product containing a phosphorous
compound shall be distributed or sold within the boundaries of this mu-
nicipality.
Article VII. Waste Disposal
1. Every person being served by the municipal sanitation department
must separate his disposable waste into four categories:17
(a) Paper;
(b) Glass;
(c) Metal containers; and
(d) Other.
2. If noncompliance with section 1 of this article is found pursuant to
procedures set forth in article II, section 5, the Commission shall notify
the municipal sanitation department to cease service to the violating
person until the violator agrees to comply with the requirements of sec-
tion 1 of this article.
86. The regulation by a municipality of noise pollution was upheld by Fetch
v. Police Justice Court, 7 App. Div. 2d 854, 181 N.Y.S.2d 904 (2d Dep't 1959).
87. A local ordinance requiring separation of different types of refuse was
upheld in Silver v. City of Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 2d 134, 31 Cal. Rptr. 545
(2d Dist. 1963).
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Article VIII. Aesthetic Environment
1. The purpose of this Article is to attain a harmonious and aesthetically
pleasing environment for this municipality.m
2. No person shall install a billboard or illuminated sign larger than
three feet by three feet without a certificate from the Commission.
3. The Commission shall set standards by which applications for a cer-
tificate pursuant to section 2 of this article shall be judged. In setting its
standards, the Commission shall seek to fulfill the purpose of this article
as stated in section 1 of this article.
Article IX. "Person" defined
Whenever used within this Code, the term "person" shall refer to any
natural person, corporation or other legal entity.
88. The power of a locality to legislate with respect to the aesthetic environ-
ment was recognized in People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240
N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963), where an ordinance banning the hanging of laundry facing
a street was found constitutional.
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